The analysis of the black-white wage gap typically assigns someresponsibility to the observable productive characteristics each group of workersbrings to the labor marketand treats the remaining residual of unexplained wage differences as a measure of current labor market discrimination. Most studies conclude that although differences in workercharacteristics are important sources of black-white wage differentials, current labor market discrimination accounts for at least one-third to one-half of the overall gap.
In this paper, we attempt to address two well-known problemsthat have plagued numerous previous empirical studies of black-white wage gaps. First, some do not accountfor the fact that many productive characteristics are endogenousandcanbe affected by labor market discrimination.' In empirical studies of black-white wage differences, researchers have included controls for characteristics such as occupation, postsecondary schooling, part-time work, marital status, geographical location, and actual labor market experience (see Corcoran and Duncan 1979; Reimers 1983; Smith and Welch 1986; O'Neill 1990; Blau and Beller 1992; Oaxaca and Ransom 1994) . Sinceall these variables are subject to worker choice and could be contaminated by current labor marketdiscrimination, controlling for them in wage regressions may misstate the wage effects of current discrimination.
At the same time, most studies do not adequately address the fact that, on average, blacks and whites enter the labor marketwith different levels of skill. Although years of school is typically used as a measure of workerskill, this variable is less than satisfactory. To begin, years of schoolingis an inherently noisy measure of workerskill because it measures an input, not an outcome." Moreover, years of school may systematically overstate the relative skill of blacks. Evidence from standardized tests indicates that black children exhibit ' Blinder (1973) was thefirst to distinguish between and to estimate structural and reduced-form wage equationsin the context of discrimination. Cain's (1986) survey of the literature on estimating wage discrimination also discussesthis issue.
* Because blacks receive less formal schooling than whites, it is straightforward to show that this source of measurement error creates a bias toward overstating the magnitude of the black-white wage gap.
BLACK-WHITE WAGE DIFFERENCES 871 lower levels of achievementthan white children in the same grade.® As a consequence, analyses that rely on schooling as a measure of skill will likely overstate the effect of current labor market discrimination on wages and confuse the barriers that black children face in acquiring humancapital with the obstacles that black adults face when they enter the labor market.
Weuse the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to examinethe black-white wage gap among workers in their late twenties. In our regressions, we control for a single measureofskill, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). We argue that our approach improves on previous work in this area because thetest is taken by our sample before market entry and is thereforeless likely to be contaminated by worker choices or labor market discrimination. Further, as we show later on, independentstudies verify that the AFQTis a racially unbiased measureof basic skills that helps predict actual job performance.
Our results can be interpreted as estimates of the portion of the overall racial wage gap attributable to human capital formation before the age of 16-18. Even though we do not observe every aspect of skill, our estimates will not overstate this portion unless blacks surpass whites in unobserved productive characteristics.
The first half of the paper presents the basic wage regressions and showstheir robustness to alternative specifications or interpretations of the data. The second half of the paper explores someof the reasons black youths acquire less skill than whites. Family background variables that affect the cost or difficulty parents face in investing in their children's skill explain roughly one-third of the racial test score differential. Measures of school environmentaccountfor part of the remaining gap in test scores.
While we find someevidence of labor market discrimination, we conclude that the disadvantages young black workers now face in the labor market arise mostly from the obstacles they faced as children in acquiring productive human capital. Our analysis suggests that public policy should focus on the plight of black children in acquiring skills valued by the labor market.
I. The Basic Result
The model underlying our empirical results views the amount of humancapital youths have attained by their late teens as a predeter-> Data from the High School and Beyond Survey of 1980 (by the National Center for Educational Statistics) show that among high school students in the same grade, meanscores for black children fall well below the meansfor whites on not only tests of math and verbal achievementbutalso tests of writing, science, and civics achievement. minedinitial condition that constrains the future path of humancapital and, hence, future wages. After the late teens, further investments in humancapital, work experience, and occupation are endogenous choices that affect wages but are constrained by theinitial level of human capital. Therefore, using postsecondary education, experience, and occupation as regressors in a wage equation would bias our estimate of the effect of race on wagesif discrimination against blacks causes them to choose jobs and training opportunities different from those chosen by whites. Instead, we look at reduced-form wage equations that include only variables that are exogenous or determined before labor market entry: ethnicity, gender, age, and test score. These reduced-form wage equations are appropriate because we are primarily interested in the total effect of race on wagesafter age 18, not the partial effect conditioning on endogenouscovariates. We can then estimate the share of the total racial wage gap determined by the time a youngpersonis in his or herlate teens.
Ideal data for estimating the effect of labor market discrimination on black-white wage gaps could be generated bya social experiment that observes a group ofidentically skilled teenagers both toward the end of secondary school andlater during their labor marketcareers. Everything relevant for wages that happens to them after secondary school could be affected by discrimination: postsecondary schooling, marriage, occupation, on-the-job learning, and so on. Underthe assumption that there are no racial differences in discount rates or willingness to supply labor, the wage gaps observed during their careers would then represent the cumulative effects of labor market discrimination.
Instead of ideal experimental data, we use a sample ofindividuals for whom we have a good measureofskill that is not directly affected by career choices or labor market discrimination because the measurement is taken just before these workers enter the labor market or make important choices about schooling. Such a sample can be foundin the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY), a panel data set of 12,686 young people born between 1957 and 1964.* The NLSYconsists of both a nationally representative cross-section sample and a supplemental sample designed to oversample blacks, Hispanics, and low-income whites. The oversamples of blacks and Hispanics represent random samples for the black and Hispanic populations. Our analysis combinesthe cross-section sample and the supplemental samples of blacks and Hispanics. The resulting sample contains ran4The data are described in more detail in App. BLACK-WHITE WAGE DIFFERENCES 873 dom samples within racial or ethnic groups, although as groupsblacks and Hispanics are overrepresented.
In 1980, the ArmedServices Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was administered to over 90 percent of the members of the NLSY panel. This is a set of 10 tests, of which a subset of four constitutes the AFQT." The military services use the AFQT for enlistment screening and scores on various parts of the entire ASVAB for job assignmentwithin the military. When the AFQT was administeredin 1980 , the NLSY panel members, born between 1957 and 1964 ranged from 15 to 23 years old. The older youthsin this group had already entered the labor force asfull-time workers or proceeded to postsecondary education. Job experience and postsecondary education surely enhance human capital and will therefore increase test scores. If discrimination limits access to these humancapital investments, then postentry discrimination contaminates the test scores. To reduce this possibility, we restrict the sample to those younger mem_bers whose schooling choices were constrained by compulsory schooling laws until at least 1978 and wholikely would not have entered the labor market full-time by 1980. We analyze respondents born after 1961 who would have been 18 or younger when they took the AFQT. Most of this group had neither entered the labor market full-time norstarted postsecondary schooling when they weretested.® As a consequence, discrimination either in the labor market or in postsecondary education could not directly affect the test performance ofblacks in this young cohort.
The results presented in the paper pertain to this younger subset of the NLSY panel, which we feel provides the cleanest estimates of residual wage gaps. However, when weestimate every specification using the full sample, wefind that the implied black-white differences in the meansofthe conditional wage offer distributions are slightly smaller. This result is expected if discrimination adversely affects access to learning opportunities in the labor market or postsecondary°T here are two different scoring systemsfor the AFQT. The 1980 version employs ASVABscores from the paragraph comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, and numerical operations tests. The 1989 version employs the mathematics knowledge score instead of the numerical operations score. Here, we use the 1989 scoring system. In an earlier version of this paper, we reported results based on the 1980 version. In almost every specification, black-white wage gapsareslightly smaller whenthe 1980 version is used as a control for premarketskill. Further, the correlations between wages and the 1980 versionarea little stronger forall racial groups. Nonetheless, we employ the 1989 version because the military validation studies relating to racial fairness are more exhaustive for this later version.
© No respondent in this sample had completed a year of schooling beyond high school by May 1980 andless than 1 percent had even enrolled in college by this date. The AFQT was administered in the summerof 1980. education. Then the AFQT scoresof older blacks will in part reflect the consequencesof discrimination.
Columns | and 4 of table 1 show simple regressions of log wage rates in 1990 and 1991 (when this sample was aged 26-29) on age and ethnic or racial group dummies for men and women,respectively.' The coefficients on black, -.244 and -.185, are measures of the unadjusted log wage gaps between blacks and whites. We seek to explain these gaps.
Using the AFQT score as the measure ofskill in the log wage regressions produces our central results, shown in columns 3 and 6 of table 1.5 Since panel members took the AFQTat different ages and scores clearly rise with age, we adjusted the raw AFQTscorefor age at the test date and also normalized the score so that the sample mean is zero and the standard deviation is one. Our normalized AFQTvariable is highly significant in the wage regression and reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on black to -.072 for men and .035 for women. This test score explains nearly three-quarters of the racial wage gap for young men andall of the gap for young women. Moreover, when wage rather than log(wage) is used as the dependentvariable, unreported results show smallstatistically insignificant racial differences in wages for either sex when AFQTis included."
The wage regressions in columns 3 and 6 showthat the average marginal effect of a standard deviation of test score on log wagesis roughly .2 for both men and women.Since the black meantest score for each sex is about a standard deviation lower than the corresponding white mean, the test score gaps accountfor large portions of the black-white log wage gaps of -.18 and -.24 found for women and men, respectively.
Our estimates show that, when AFQT1s held constant, black and Hispanic women earn more than white women. In fact, Hispanic women earn about 15 percent more, and the estimated differential is clearly statistically significant. We do not have a good explanation for this result, but we do offer two observations. First, Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) report a similar result when they examine ' The wagevariable is the log of the mean ofreal wages in 1990 and 1991 for workers who workedin both years and the log of the real wage in the year of employmentfor workers who worked in only one year. Those who worked in neither year have no wage data and are excluded from these regressions.
®'The square of AFQT, intended to capture deviations from log-linearity, is not significant here but is included to preserve comparability with later specifications. In a few instances, the deviation from linearity is significant.°I n these regressions, similar to those in table 1, black men earn $0.27 per hour less than white men and black women earn $0.03 per hour more than white women, but neither differenceis statistically significant. Note.-The dependentvariable is the log of hourly wages. The wage observations come from 1990 and 1991. All wages are measured in 1991 dollars. If a person worksin both years, the wage is measured as the average of the two wage observations. Wage observations below $1.00 per hour or above $75 are eliminated from the data. The sample consists of the NLSY cross-section sample plus the supplemental samples of blacks and Hispanics. Respondents who did not take the ASVABtest are eliminated from the sample. Further, 163 respondents are eliminated because the records documenta problem with theirtest. All respondents were born after 1961. Standard errors are in parentheses.
skill-adjusted gaps among 24-year-old women.'°Second,it is possible that selection effects contaminate the estimates of racial wage gaps for women. Forall women, the mean of observed wageslikely overstates the meanof the wage offer distribution. If this selection effect is most acute in the minority samples, the results in table 1 will understate the wagecosts of racial discrimination suffered by women. Such a result seemslikely if highly skilled minority women haveless nonearned incomethan their white counterparts.
However, since we have no direct evidence concerning the extent of selection bias in the three samples of women, we focus most of our attention on men. Wepresent parallel results for women, but a complete analysis of the racial wage gaps observed among women remains a topic for further research.
The usual approachis to control for skill with a schooling variable. Whenyears of schooling (in 1991 when wages are observed) is used instead of AFQT as the measureofskill (as shown in cols. 2 and 5 of table 1), it reduces the unadjusted wage gap by only one-fifth for men and only one-sixth for women.
'? Murnaneet al. report a Hispanic-white wage gap of .105 among women. Their approach differs from ours not only because they look at younger workers but also because they include numerouscontrols for work history and family background.
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Somehave arguedthat our specification should include controls for both AFQTandeither yearsof total schooling or years of schooling following the AFQT. Weprefer the AFQTonly specification for several reasons. Given AFQT, schooling measures serve as proxies for skills that either are not captured by AFQTorare acquired after the test date. In either case, schooling is an indirect measure of these skills, andit is straightforward to show that given the other controls in Our specification, this source of measurementerror introduces a bias toward overstating the black-white wage gap. Further, as we noted previously, this bias will be magnified if years of schooling is not only a noisy measure but also one that systematically overstates the relative skill of blacks.
Finally, in our sample, schooling completed after the AFQTisprimarily schooling completed beyond the age of compulsory attendance and is therefore endogenous. Postsecondary schooling decisions are based in part on expected pecuniary returns from further educational investments, which will, in turn, be affected by patterns of discrimination in the labor market. Our goal here is not to document all the ways that discrimination might affect career paths, but instead to provide a summary measure ofthe effect of current labor market discrimination on wages.!! Nonetheless, for completeness, we provide an Appendix table with results from three different specifications that include controls for both AFQT and measuresofeither total schooling or schooling completed after the AFQT.™ Because the estimated returns to schooling conditional on AFQTaresignificantly greater for blacks than for whites, we estimated each of the specifications separately for blacks and whites. Then, for each specification, we formed twoestimates of the black-white wage gap, one based on the sample meansof observed characteristics in each sample. Oursix estimates of the conditional log wage gap range from -.054 to -.093. The median of these estimates is -.075. Among women,the estimated black-white gaps are small conditional on these measures of education, and in five of six Cases, they arestatistically insignificant. So, while we prefer the specification without any schoolingvariables, results from the specifications that include them support our main conclusions.
It is useful to comparethese results with those of other studies, many of which use different data sets and a wider rangeof ages than '' Separate analyses of the black and white samples show that amongstudents with identical age-adjusted AFQTscores, blacks earn higher returns to additional schooling and, in fact, complete about two quarters more of additional post-AFQT schooling.
'? In App.table A2, we employ(i) total grades completed by 1991, (ii) grades completed after taking the AFQT,and(iii) dummies for high school and college graduation.
BLACK-WHITE WAGE DIFFERENCES 877 we do. O'Neill's (1990) study employs the 1980 version of the AFOT as a measure Ofskill in wage equations on NLSY data. O'Neill derives black-white wage gaps for men between 22 and 29 years of age. Her regressions of log wages ontotal years of schooling, potential experience, region, and AFQTimply estimates of the residual black-white gap that range from -.046 to -.101. When she includes in her regressions additional controls for industry, occupation, and actual work experience, the black-white wage gap disappears.
All of O'Neill's specifications include controls that may be affected by current labor marketdiscrimination.'® In addition, it appears that her analysis included the NLSY supplementary sample of economically disadvantaged whites. For these reasons, O'Neill's results may understate the effects of current labor market discrimination." Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) used Current Population Survey data on men over 25 and found a log wage gap between blacks and whites of -.221, which fell to -.125 with controls for observable characteristics. Reimers (1983) found an unadjusted log wage difference of -.233 in the Survey of Income and Education data on menofall ages, with an adjusted gap of .132. Corcoran and Duncan (1979) estimated the residual black-white wage gap for men ofall ages in 1975 using an extensive list of variables from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics but could explain only 53 percent of it. Even though all these studies use many independentvariables as controls, we can account for a greater portion of the unadjusted wage gap with a single measureofskill. Cutright's (1973) study relating AFQTs for Korean War draftees to their earnings in 1964 yields results roughly similar to ours for whites, but a much lower payoff to skill for blacks. As a result, he finds that AFQT explains only a quarter of the black-white wage gap, which is a much smaller fraction than our results in table 1 suggest. The contrast between ourresults for 1990-91 wages and Cutright's results for 1964 is consistent with the well-documented advance in the relative wages of blacks that occurred after the civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s (see Freeman 1981; Donohue and Heckman 1991) . 15 In O'Neill's sample, AFQT is endogenousbecause she includes people who were aged 19-23 whenthey took the test and therefore may have started postsecondary schooling or full-time work.
14 Further, O'Neill includes in her wage regressions workers who are 22-25 years of age, ages at which wage differences are likely to understate lifetime differences in earning capacity. The hypothesis that O'Neill's results understate the black-white wage gap is supportedbythefact that the unadjusted wage gap is smaller in her sample than in our study and otherssimilarto it. In related work on returns to educational quality, Maxwell (1994) also notes that, among men, controls for AFQT reduce black-white wage gaps substantially.
We now discuss possible objections to our interpretation of the results in table 1.
Is the AFQT Racially Biased?
An obvious objection to ourinterpretation oftable 1 is that the AFOT is a racially biased test in the sense that its scores underpredict productivity or job performance for blacks comparedto whites. For many tests, it would be impossible to judge the validity of such an assertion because wetypically have no wayof directly measuring job performance andrelating it to the test scores received. However, in 1991 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) completed an exhaustive study with the Department of Defense of the validity of the AFOT with special emphasis on the racial fairness of the test. The unique aspect of the NASstudyis that job performance was measured without using either supervisor evaluations or written tests, two methods that could be seen as introducingracial bias. Instead, for several military occupational specialties, direct measures of performance on the tasks constituting the job were undertaken. As an example, the job of infantry rifleman in the Marine Corps was broken into 15 tasks and each task further divided into subtasks. Subtasks were small enough that performance could be evaluated by a (1, 0) yes-no scoring system, which ensured a high degree of consistency across evaluators. Military job experts designed a weighting system that translates the subtask scores into a composite job performance measure.'? Then these "hands-on" measures of job performance were regressed on the AFQT score of the individual at the time he or she enlisted in the military.
How well does AFQT predict military job performance? For the 23 military occupations studied, the correlations between AFQT scores and job performance ranged from .13 to .49, with a median correlation of .38.!°The more important question, however, concerns racial bias, a key issue for the NAS panel. It concluded that AFOQT does not systematically underpredict black job performance relative to white performance: "for practical purposes the same regression lines predicted performance about as well for both groups" (Wigdor 15 Examples of tasks tested are land navigation, squad automatic weapons, first aid, night vision device, rifle, live fire, etc. (see Wigdor and Green 1991, vol. 1). 16 These correlations are likely to understate the correlation between AFQT and a general skill or capacity to learn a specific task because selection into military occupational specialties is accomplished in part with test scores. Hence the rangeoftest scores for any particular job is truncated. Since AFQTisalso used to select individuals into the military, any observations aboutracial differences in the power of AFQTto predict military job performance apply only to the individuals joining the military.
and Green 1991, p. 179).'' If anything,test scores slightly overpredict job performanceby blacks. We view the NASfindingsas strong independentverification that the AFQTcan be considereda racially unbiased predictor of success in acquiring newskills in the military, and we haveno reasonto believe that the AFQT would be a racially biased predictor of success in acquiringcivilian job skills.
Do Blacks Underinvest in Skill Because the
Return Is Lower? Models of discrimination developed by Arrow (1973) and Lundberg and Startz (1983) yield discriminatory equilibria from black-white differences in the return to acquiringskill. In both models, blacks with more skill have more difficulty distinguishing themselves to employers than high-skill whites, and therefore the payoff to acquiringskill is lower for blacks. Our results in table 1 indicate that blacks and whites earn different wagesin large part because they typically begin their careers with different levels of human capital. These models of discrimination highlight the possibility that black youths enter the labor market with relatively few skills simply because they anticipate that the returns from acquiringskills will be low.
Weinvestigate this possibility in tables 2 and 3. While we have no direct evidence about the expectations of these youths, we can look for differences amongblacks, whites, and Hispanics in the realized effects of AFQTscores oncivilian wages. The regression equations reported in column 1 of both tables 2 and 3 include aninteraction between black and AFQT. For men, there is some indication that black menfarerelatively better at the high end of the AFQTdistribution. For women, the opposite is true. However, for both sexes, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are jointly insignificant.'* The remaining results in tables 2 and 3 show the marginal effect of AFQT on log wages for each racial group. There are small, Statistically insignificant black-white differences for men in table 2, and columns 2 and 3 of table 3 show that AFQT exerts an almost identical effect on the wages of black and white women. For both black and white men and women,the law of one price roughly holds for skill as measured by AFQT. Nonetheless, since the Cutright (1973) study found that the return to skill investment was lower for '7 At the meanlevel of black test scores, the average overprediction of black performance, in standardized units, is .15 when the job includes at least 75 blacks tested (Wigdor and Green 1991, p. 178) . Overprediction also occurs on average for jobs with smaller samples of blacks.
'® Underthe null hypothesis that the coefficients on both interaction termsare zero, the F-statistics for the male and female regressions are 2.20 and 2.17, respectively. NotE.-The "all races" sample includes all women from the sample described in table 1. All respondents were born after 1961. Standard errors are in parentheses.
blacks in 1964, we cannotrule outthe possibility that the young black adults in the NLSY or their parents expected lower returnsto skill when they choselevels of investment. Our data cannot address this issue.
Although Hispanic women earn returns to AFQT that resemble the returns for black and white men and women,it is puzzling that Hispanic men earn substantially lower returns. We do not have an explanation for this result, but we can report that our estimate of the conditional black-white wage gap changeslittle when we drop Hispanics from the sample.
What about the Labor Market Dropouts?
The work of Butler and Heckman (1977) and Brown (1984) has alerted labor economists to the importanceof considering differences in labor force participation by race whenestimating wage differences. Since market wages for nonparticipants are not observed, they are typically dropped from standard wage equations(as they were from the regressions reported in tables 1, 2, and 3). In the male sample, labor market dropouts are disproportionately black and arelikely to have relatively low wage offers. Figure 1 showsthat, at most levels of AFQT,labor force participation rates for black men are lower than the rates for white men.'" The exclusion of nonparticipants could understate the effect of race on the mean of the male wageoffer distribution. One wayto addressthe selection problem is to model the labor force participation decision explicitly and estimate a structural model of wage offers and participation. However, the difficulty of identifying such a modelled us to consider other approaches." Wecannot make inferences about the wageoffer distribution without some assumption concerning the wage offers of nonparticipants. Supposethat all nonparticipants have wage offers below the median offer made to workers with comparable skills. In this case, we can estimate medians of conditional log wage offer distributions by assigning nonparticipants an arbitrarily low wage."! Under the addi-'9 A participantis defined as someone whoreported in either 1990 or 1991 that he or she had worked at some timesince the last NLSY interview. Interviews are about a year apart. This definition is not the same as the Current Population Survey definition, which is whether one workedlast week. Our measurewill, of course, yield higher rates of participation. *0 Identification is achieved in such models with either exclusion restrictions or as- tional assumption that the means and mediansofthe conditional log wage offer distributions are equal, this approach yields a consistent estimate of the black-white gap in mean log wageoffers.
To illustrate, suppose that the best wage offer for worker 7 is a log-linear function of characteristics:
In(wage offer;) = B,,white; + B, black; + 8, Hispanic;
(1) + aAFQOT;, + ¢€;, where €; is an independent draw from a distribution G(e;) whose mean and medianare both zero. The effect of race on the mean of the log wage offer distribution is the same as the effect of race on the medianof the log wage offer distribution, namely 8, -8,,. Consider a groupof individuals with identical characteristics. If all the nonparticipants in that group have wageoffers less than the median. wage offer for the group and if more than half participate, then the median of the log wage offer distribution is the same as the median of the distribution formed by adding the nonparticipants to the bottom of the observed market log wage distribution." Therefore, we twenties. For this group, child care demands maybe an importantfactor in participation decisions. Therefore, the link between wage offers and participation may be weakened.
*? Even at very low AFQTscores, our data show participation rates of men well above 50 percent. construct our sample of log wage offers by assigning log wages of zero (hourly wages of one cent) to all male nonparticipants. This strategy ensures that our imputed offers for nonparticipants always fall below the relevant conditional medians. Table 4 presents median regression results based on this sample.
The racial wage gap at the median moves from -.352 to -.134
when AFQTis added to the regression. Whether we condition on
AFQTor not, these median regressions showa larger negative effect of being black than the regressions on participants in table 1, where the adjusted gap for men was -.072. The contrast betweenthe results at the mean andat the median supports the view that looking only at participants masks somediscrimination. Nonetheless, over 60 percent of the difference in mediansis explained by our one measure of skill. Smith and Welch (1986) use a different method to estimate the racial difference in the conditional meansof the wageoffer distributions. They observe that the mean of the wage offer distribution, E(w), is a weighted average of the mean wageoffers for participants and nonparticipants: E(w) = LFPR E(w| participate) (2 + (1 -LFPR)E(w|don'tparticipate).
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The ratio of the means of the wage offer distributions facing two groups, 7 and j, can therefore be written as
whereB, the selection bias, is equal to°= 5) LFPR, +f , 4) and _ E(w;|don't participate) E(w,| participate)
Conditional on the sample labor force participation rates of each group, we can derive B for various valuesof k, the ratio of the means of nonparticipant wages to participant wages." If k,, = k,, then k must be .1 or less in order to generate the selection bias implied by the difference between our mean and medianregression results. To see this, note that the mean gap of -.072 log point implies a black/ white wageratio of .931, and the median gap of -.134 yieldsa selection corrected ratio of .875. Theratio of these two is .94. If we assume that k, = k,, = .l and use the sample labor force participation rates (.91 for black men and .975 for white men) as proxies for the true probabilities of participation, the Smith-Welch bias formula gives B = .94. The difference between the race effects in the mean and median regressions showsthat selection bias may contaminate our ordinary least squares estimates of black-white wage gaps. However, using the Smith-Welch method, we cannotgenerate such a large correction for selection bias unless we are willing to assume that the mean wage offer of nonparticipants is only one-tenth of the mean offer among observationally similar participants. Since equation (4) follows directly from basic statements about conditional expectations, we feel comfortable viewing the -.134 gap as an upper bound onthe absolute value of the black-white gap in mean wageoffers.
This section began with a discussion of median regression. We have also examinedthe black-white wage gapat the seventy-fifth and nine-?3 It is obviously difficult to measurethis quantity directly. Smith and Welch compare the wages of individuals whoparticipate intermittently with those who participate all the time, but their measure is probably upwardly biased because those who do not participate at all, whose wages are never observed, likely have the lowest wage offers. Another approachis to makedistributional assumptions aboutthe wage offer distribution and then infer the unobserved lowertail from the observed accepted wages. tieth percentiles of the wage distribution. For men, both the conditional and unconditional black-white log wage gaps are smaller at these percentiles than at the median. In fact, the estimated conditional gap at the ninetieth percentile is only -.042 andis statistically insignificant. Thus there is no evidence that the black-white gap in mean offers is driven by the systematic exclusion of blacks from the best jobs available to workers of a given skill level. Conditional on AFQT,the gap in median log wages between blacks and whites is much greater than the gapat the ninetieth percentile of the distributions.
How Well Does the Wage Gap at Age 30 Represent the Lifetime Gap?
Ourdata restrict us to looking at labor market outcomes for workers in a fairly narrow age range (ages 26-29). One might object that evidence on wages of young adults cannot be used to make inferences about the wagegapfortherest of the life cycle. If the lifetime trajectories of log wages for whites and blacks were parallel, one could extrapolate the results here to say something aboutlifetime earnings. However,if discrimination in the labor market prevented blacks from investing heavily in on-the-job experience, then blacks may haveflatter log wage trajectories and the log wage gap may widen with age. Unfortunately, there is contradictory evidence about the black-white log wage gap overthelife cycle. Smith and Welch (1986) generally find narrowing of the unadjusted gap in decennial census data through 1980 as a cohort ages. However, Boozer, Krueger, and Walkon (1992, p. 317) include 1990 data and show that for older cohorts (born before 1940) the gap has narrowed over the life cycle; for younger cohorts, the reverse is true. Whether the pattern of these younger cohorts will be maintained over time is an open question. Further, for a given cohort, trends in the overall black-white wage gap may be different from trendsin the gap conditional on premarket skill.
II. The Determinants of AFQT Scores
Nowthat we have established the importance of the AFQTscore as a measureof the skills young workers bring to the labor market and as an explanation for lower wage rates among blacks, the following natural question arises: Why do blacks score lower onthis test? Figures 2 and 3 show the sample distributions of test scores by race for men and women, respectively. Over 35 percent of black men score below -1.0 but less than 10 percent of white men do. Again, we stress that we view thetest as a test of achievement and learnedskill, not of innate ability, so we seek reasons that black youths have acquiredless skill than white youths. Since the payoff to acquiringskill is roughly the same for black and white women and men,we conclude that the investmentdifferential between the racesis likely to be driven by differences in the costs of acquiring skill. Why do black youths (and their parents) find it more costly to invest in skill than white youths? Obviously, past and currentdiscrimination against black families affects the constraints black parents face in investing in their children. For example, if education and high income makeit easier to invest in children's humancapital, then part of the racial difference in AFQT scores can be attributed to racial differences in parental education and income. Table 5 documents the extent to which observed aspects of family background account for the observed black-white gap in AFQT scores for men. Column | of table 5 sets the stage by estimating the unexplained score differences for men in the sample we have used for tables 1-4, those born after 1961. As column 1 shows, the mean black score is one standard deviation below the mean white score, with Hispanics about .7 of a standard deviation below. The corresponding result for women,in table 6, showsonly a slightly smaller black-white score differential.
The NLSY data include manyvariables describing the household in which the respondent wasraised. In column 2, we present results from a specification that includes controls for the parents' capacity to provide humancapital for their children. The results show that the achievementof children on the AFQTvaries positively with the education and professional status of their parents. Further, given these controls, the black-white gapin scoresfalls to -.70 for men and -.72 for women.
These measures of family background serve only as rough measures of parental resources, and although it would be difficult to construct precise measures, we do knowthat parental resourcesaffect optimal choices of family size and child quality. Column 3 introduces additional controls for family size and parental investment. Both numberof siblings and two measuresof family reading materials are strongly correlated with test scores. Further, the black-white gaps in scores fall to -.62 for women and -.57 for men when they are included.
Schools differ in many observed dimensions, and residential segregation by race may also affect parents' capacity to invest in their children. Column 4 in tables 5 and 6 reports an AFQT regression with several school characteristics included: student/teacherratio, dis- Notge.-The dependent variable is the age-adjusted AFQT score. In all specifications, the sample excludes respondents with invalid AFQTscores. In specification 4, the sample also excludes respondents with invalid responses to the school survey items employedin col. 4. Specifications 3 and 4 also include dummies for whether or not the respondent has knowledge of the educational background of his or her mother or father. Specification 4 also includes a private school dummy. Theestimated coefficient is positive but notstatistically significant. All background information comes from the 1979 wave of the NLSY. The dummyvariables for reading materials are constructed from information about magazines, newspapers, and library cards in the home. "Numerous" means all of the above. "No" meansnoneof the above. All respondents were born after 1961. Standard errors are in parentheses. advantaged studentratio, student dropoutrate, and teacher turnover rate."* Each works in the expected direction, and together they further reduce the unexplained AFQT gap between blacks and whites.
The residual gap falls to -.42 for men and -.58 for women."
4 The NLSYschoolsurvey obtained information directly from the high school the respondentlast attended. Unfortunately, the sample sizes are smaller for this analysis because many schools did not respond. Only .45 of the black students have valid responses for the items used here. The corresponding figure for whitesis . 57. 25 Boozeretal. (1992) argue that black students suffer from racial isolation in school and less access to computers, both of which act to reduce their wages as adults. In contrast, Grogger (1996) findslittle direct effect of school characteristics on the racial 8go JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Even with our controls for both family and school environment, sizable black-white gaps in AFQT remain. However, we can account for a significant fraction of the overall gap using only a few measures of family background and secondary school environment. For example, elementary school environments may also be important, but we have no measure of them.
Although webelieve that the black-white gap in AFQT scoresreflects differences in acquired skills, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) have generated significant controversy recently by using AFQT as a measure of inherentability. Specifically, they claim that AFQT is a nearly exogenous measure of cognitive ability that is not greatly affected by additional schooling or other humancapital investments. However, ourinvestigation generated twosets of results that are inconsistent with the claims made by Herrnstein and Murray.
Appendix table A3 presents four regressions of standard AFQT scores on dummies for race and year of birth. The regressions provide estimates of the black-white gaps in standardscores not only for the sample of respondents who took thetest at age 18 or younger but also for those who were between 19 and 23 at the time of the test. To the extent that AFQT scores measure immutable individual traits, racial gaps in these scores should be constantacross age groups. However, in both the male and female samples, the estimated racial gaps in scores are larger in the sample of older respondents.*°Since differences between blacks and whites in both work experience and years of schooling grow with the age of the respondents, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that differential investment contributes to the black-white gap in scores.
Appendix table A3 provides indirect evidence that humancapital investments affect AFQT scores. We also provide more direct evidence on the link between schooling and AFQT scores. We ran instrumental variables regressions of standard AFQT scores on dummies for year of birth, dummies for race, and grades of school completed by May of 1980 (the test was administered during the summer of 1980). Again, we use only respondents born after 1961 and run separate regressions for males and females. Following Angrist and Krueger (1991), we use quarter of birth as an instrument for grades completed."' wage gap. However,his analysis includes controls for variables that are outcomes of school quality, such as test scores and postsecondary schooling.
26 In a samplethat includes both cohorts, the standard deviation of AFQTscoresis 38.01 for men and 35.27 for women. The fourestimated age differencesin racial gaps range from -3.5 to -7.03 andarestatistically significant at the 10 percentlevel.
27 In our sample of teenagers, the effect of birth quarter on schoolingarises primarily from restrictions on the age at which students may enter school. Most localities have These results cast more doubt on Herrnstein and Murray's claims that AFOT measuresan inherenttrait. For both sexes, the estimated coefficients on grades completedarelarge andstatistically significant. The coefficient estimates imply that an additional year of schooling raises AFQT scores for men and women by .22 and .25 standard deviations, respectively.?® Thus the black-white gap in meanscoresis roughly equivalent to the skill-building effect of just over four years of secondary schooling."°I II. Conclusion Our results echo a common theme in much ofthe recentliterature on wage determination. Recent studies indicate that the return to measuredskills is large in today's labor market. Although earlier research often failed to detect a strong relationship between wages and test score measures of achievement or aptitude, recent work by Bishop (1991) and by Murnaneet al. (1995) finds that, during the 1980s, the labor market return to skills as measured bytest scores rose dramatically.
After decades of narrowing, the unadjusted black-white wage gap has either widenedorfailed to shrink further since 1980.°°Consider-able disagreementexists about the causes of this recent pattern, but several studies emphasize the interaction between black-white skill gaps and therising value of skill in the 1980s. Our results cannot directly address the question of changesin the racial wage gap over time because the limited span of birth years in the data limits our ability to observe changes in the relationship betweentest scores and wages for workersin their late twenties. Nonetheless ourresults are rules or guidelines concerning the age a child must be to enter school, and children born in the last quarter of the year often start school a year later than students born earlier in the samecalendaryear. In our data, the average of grades completed at the time of the AFQT declines slightly over the first three quarters of a given birth year and falls substantially between the third and fourth quarters.
28 By contrast, Herrnstein and Murray claim that an additional year of schooling raises scores by only .07 standard deviation (1994, p. 591) . Ceci (1991) reviews studies of the effect of schooling on measured IQ and concludesthat there is an important causal link between exposure to formal schooling and measuredintelligence. °B ound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) demonstrate that even in large samples, instrumental variables estimates maybe seriously biased if the instruments are weakly correlated with the potentially endogenousvariable. Ourpartial R"'s for the quarter of birth dummiesin thefirst-stage regressions are .074 for men and .046 for women. Our F-statistics on the significance of the quarter of birth dummiesin thefirst-stage regressions are 46.6 and 29.3, respectively. According to the criteria set forth by Bound et al., the implied bias is quite small for both males and females.
30 See Bishop (1991) , Juhn, Murphy,andPierce (1991) , Bound and Freeman (1992) , Card and Krueger (1992) , Ferguson (1993) , and Smith (1993) for treatments ofthis issue.
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY consistent with the view that blacks have suffered relative to whites from recent increases in the marketprice ofskill.
While our results do provide some evidence of current labor market discrimination, our primary findingis that large skill gaps between blacks and whites are an important determinantof the blackwhite wage differences. Future research on the determinants of the black-white wage gap should focus on the obstacles black children face in acquiring productiveskill. NoTEe.-These sample meanspertain to persons who were born between 1962 and 1964 and havevalid responses to the relevant questionnaire items. Blacks account for approximately 30 percent ofthe total observations. Hispanics account for 20 percent. The total sample size is roughly 3,400, but the total numberof observations varies across survey items. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 1962-64 1957-61 1962-64 1957-61 (N = 1,882) (N = 2,579) (N = 1,806) (N = 2,807) 
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